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³Of Gods and Men´: Selected Print Media Coverage of Natural Disasters and 
Industrial Failures in Three Westminster Countries 
 
Kevin. F. Quigley and John L. Quigley 
 
Abstract 
This article examines selected print media coverage of a domestic natural disaster 
and domestic industrial failure in each of three Westminster countries: Australia, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom. It studies this coverage from several 
perspectives: the volume of coverage; the rate at which the articles were 
published; the tone of the headlines; and a content analysis of the perceived 
performance of key public and private institutions during and following the 
events. Its initial findings reveal that the natural disasters received more coverage 
than the industrial failures in each of the newspapers considered. There was also 
no significant difference in the publication rate across event type or newspaper. In 
each case, government was assessed at least as frequently and negatively as non-
government actors, particularly during and following industrial failures. The 
manner in which government and non-government actors were assessed following 
these events suggests that, contrary to government claims that owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure (CI) are responsible for its successful operation, 
government in fact is ³in the frame´ as frequently as the industry owners and 
operators are. In addition, the negative assessments of governments following 
industrial failures in particular may prompt over-reaction by policy makers to 
industrial failures and under-reaction to natural disasters. This inconsistency is 
indeed ironic because the latter occur more often and cost more, both financially 
and socially. We reviewed 340 newspaper articles from three different 
newspapers: The Australian¶V coverage of the Canberra bushfires and the 
Waterfall train accident, The Globe and Mail¶V (Canada) coverage of Hurricane 
Juan and the de la Concorde overpass collapse, and The Daily Telegraph¶V
(United Kingdom) coverage of the 2007 floods and the Potters Bar train wreck. 
Our sample size is small; our ability to compare across newspapers and countries 
limited. Further research is warranted. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: media coverage, natural disasters, industrial failures, government 
performance 
 
Author Notes: We would like to thank our research assistants, Penney Young, 
Gillian Carter, Casey Hilliard, Reama Khayat, and Emily Pond, and the 
anonymous reviewers for their comments.  We would also like to thank 
participants at the Critical Infrastructure Protection Conference at Fo Guang 
University, Yilan, Taiwan, in October 2011, and the Disasters in the 
Infrastructure: Response and Assessment Workshop hosted by Dalhousie 
8QLYHUVLW\¶V CIP Initiative in Halifax, Canada, in October 2010.  Participants at 
both of these events provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.  
Finally, we would like to acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council (Grant No. 410-2008-1357). 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2011 tsunami in Japan shows us just how fickle media coverage is during 
major disasters that cause critical infrastructure (CI) failures: initially the media 
coverage was ripe with sympathetic depictions of devastated communities, but 
then it changed to something more sinister once the nuclear power plants became 
susceptible to failure.  The story shifted from one of vulnerable and unlucky 
populations to one of poor industry performance and lack of government 
accountability and transparency.   
The shift in the tone and focus of the coverage is important because who 
and what is being blamed changes and, in so doing, suggests to policy makers 
different types of corrective action.  The purpose of this article is to examine more 
fully the distinction between media coverage of natural disasters and industrial 
failures.  It is often taken for granted, for instance, that media amplify and 
attenuate  certain risks, thereby influencing public (and by extension policy) 
debate (Kasperson et al. 1998; Pidgeon 1997). Yet what aspect of media coverage 
is most influential after failures in critical infrastructure?  Many have argued that 
the volume of coverage reflects the flavor of public debate (Gaskell et al. 1999; 
Hood et al. 2001; Leahy and Mazur 1980).  More recent contributions in the field 
suggest, however, that volume of coverage alone is inadequate (Quigley 2005; 
Rowe, Frewer and Sjoberg 2000).     
This article begins with an examination of selected print media coverage 
of a domestic natural disaster and a domestic industrial failure in each of three 
countries.  It looks at The Australian¶V coverage of the Canberra bushfires and the 
Waterfall train accident; The Globe and Mail¶V coverage of Hurricane Juan and 
the de la Concorde overpass collapse; and The Daily Telegraph¶V coverage of the 
2007 floods in the U.K. and the Potters Bar train accident.  The natural disasters 
are all typical of their regions (fire, hurricane, and flood), and the industrial 
failures are all drawn from the transportation sector.  Media coverage was 
reviewed from the following perspectives: the volume of coverage; the rate at 
which the articles were published; the tone of the headlines; and a content analysis 
of the perceived performance of key public and private institutions during and 
following the events. 
This last point in particular²the performance assessment of key public 
and private institutions²can shed light on an important dilemma that many 
Western countries face  ,Q PRVW :HVWHUQ JRYHUQPHQWV¶ CI plans, governments 
stress that the owners and operators of CI²largely in the private sector²are 
responsible for managing their own critical assets.1 At the same time, citizens 
look to government to respond during crises.   
As we will see, each of the newspapers gave more coverage to the natural 
disasters than to the industrial failures, yet the industrial failures received more 
alarming coverage.  Moreover, government and industry were assessed generally 
more negatively following the industrial failures than they were after the natural 
disasters.  This pattern suggests that policy makers may be more likely to react 
more strongly in the aftermath of industrial failures than natural disasters despite 
the fact that natural disasters occur more frequently and usually cost more 
economically and socially.2   
We selected events from different countries partly because we obtained 
the data from a larger project that we are conducting on critical infrastructure 
protection in Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., arguably the countries 
with the most advanced CI policy regimes post-9/11.  As a result of this project, it 
might be possible over time to develop generalizable claims across the countries 
examined.  This article, however, is much more modest.  It will compare how a 
domestic natural disaster and industrial failure are covered by a leading domestic 
newspaper in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, all Westminster 
governments.  There are indications that further comparative research across 
countries may prove fruitful.  For the moment, however, this article will refrain 
from generalizing on such a small sample size.   
 
2. LEARNING ABOUT DISASTERS FROM THE MEDIA 
 
Judging the performance of public and private sector owners, operators, and 
regulators of critical infrastructure by the manner in which they are depicted in the 
media presents SDUWLFXODU FKDOOHQJHV  5HVHDUFKHUV KDYH QRWHG WKH PHGLD¶V
propensity to report the dramatic over the common but more dangerous 
(Soumerai, Ross-Degnan and Kahn 1992), their tendency not only to 
                                                          
 
2
 )RUH[DPSOHVHH3XEOLF6DIHW\&DQDGD¶V&DQDGLDQ'LVDVWHU'DWDEDVHWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO'LVDVWHU
'DWDEDVHDWWKH8QLYHUVLWpFDWKROLTXHGH/RXYDLQRUWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDORI$XVWUDOLD¶V
Emergency Management Australia Disasters Database.  The Canadian Disaster Database, for 
instance, reports that natural disasters occur 40 times more frequently in Canada than conflict 
disasters.  This ratio has been (relatively) stable for over forty years. 
sensationalize (Johnson and Cavello, 1987), but also to sensationalize the most 
negative aspects of events, in particular (Wahlberg and Sjoberg 2000). While CI 
failures are sensational and lend themselves to this type of coverage, it is not clear 
whether the events receive the coverage that they do because of their dramatic 
nature or rather because they reflect the sustained concerns of civil society. 
Moreover, researchers have also been careful to note that there is no ³one 
view´ about risks among the public who consume and respond to these media 
articles.  Risk perception is mediated through social context (Alaszewski 2005; 
Boholm 2009; Frewer 2004; Slovic et al. 2004).  It has been argued that risk 
perception among populations varies by gender (Drottz-Sjoberg 1991), education 
(Kraus, Malmfors and Slovic 2001; Rundmo 1999), degree of expertise in the 
subject matter (Brun 1994; Slovic 1987) as well as a variety of emotive factors 
(Baron, Hershey and Kunreuther 2000; Rundmo and Moen 2006). Therefore what 
one might consider important, newsworthy or even dangerous and alarming is 
subject to interpretation.  
            Mutz and Soss (1997) note that the PHGLDUDLVHSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQs of the 
salience of a subject in the community but are much less successful in changing 
SHRSOH¶VPLQGs on a particular subject.  Similarly, Atwood and Major (2000) note 
that people do not think of themselves as being as vulnerable to risks.  Indeed, 
some suffer from cognitive dissonance; they are unrealistically optimistic, 
ignoring the news and denying personal vulnerability.  It has also been argued that 
research tends to focus on print media when in fact most receive their news from 
television and radio (Cottle 2000).  The rising prominence of social media makes 
this dilemma even more problematic (Hughes and Pelan 2010).  
Nevertheless, an examination of print media coverage of CI failures offers 
some important insights.  First, notwithstanding the fact that individual perception 
may vary, researchers have noted that many people base their perceptions of risk 
primarily on information presented in the media (Fischhoff 1985, 1995; Kitzinger 
and Reilly 1997). Hood et al. argue that high-circulation newspapers do not 
necessarily reflect public opinion, but they do assume that they reflect ³the 
flavour of the public debate, not least because opinion leaders read such sources´ 
(2001, 93).  Hood et al. draw on Gaskell et al. (1999) for this analysis.  Gaskell 
and colleagues concluded that increasing amounts of coverage of technological 
controversies were associated with negative public perceptions (1999, 385), or 
what is referred to as Quantity of Coverage Theory (Leahy and Mazur 1980). Print 
media also have the advantage of being stable documents that are updated usually 
every 24 hours.  So, while the researcher may not be able to monitor how the 
story changes by the minute, as one might be able to do by researching television 
or social media, the researcher can monitor the progress of the story on a 24-hour 
basis, in the same way that one might research television or social media stories at 
24-hour intervals.  Looking at the daily paper also has the advantage of viewing a 
source that has eliminated the many errors in reporting that happen throughout the 
day during a CI event and can run amok on social media, for instance. 
Contrary to Hood et al.¶V claim that volume of coverage alone is an 
indicator of the views of civil society, there is reason to believe that a more 
nuanced reading of media coverage is required.  Quigley (2005, 2008) showed 
that, in the case of Y2K media coverage, volume of coverage alone was 
misleading; tone and content analysis provided a much closer read of civil 
VRFLHW\¶VYLHZRI WKH LVVXH Similarly, media analysis of coverage of Hurricane 
Katrina found that the story placement and the tone of media coverage had an 
impact on the force of government reaction (Barnes et al. 2008). Moeller (2006) 
distinguishes between ³simple´ emergencies, in which answers appear to be 
straightforward, and ³complex´ emergencies that require more political and social 
attention.  Natural disasters, characterized as ³simple´ emergencies, receive more 
media coverage because the events are dramatic,  but they also require relatively 
less research and background knowledge; cause and effect relationships are 
perceived to be straightforward or, at a minimum, beyond our control.  In contrast, 
industrial failures are characterized as ³complex´ emergencies; they receive less 
media attention because they require significantly more media resources and are 
not as easy to explain (Moeller 2006). 
This is not to suggest that less coverage means less concern.  Ironically, at 
times, the opposite may be true.  For example, while responses to hurricanes are 
often ad hoc DQGUHIOHFWRQ³VRFLDOSUREOHPVUHWURspectively while rarely if ever 
GHDOLQJ SURVSHFWLYHO\ ZLWK IXWXUH GLVDVWHUV´ (Barnes et al. 2008, 609), the 
coverage of industrial failures , which tends to be lighter in volume, seeks more 
often to assign blame. Pidgeon DUJXHV WKDW³GHVSLWH WKH LQKHUHQWFRPSOH[LW\ DQG
ambiguity of the environments within which large-scale hazards arise, and the 
systemic nature of breakdowns in safety, cultural myths of control over affairs 
ensures that a culprit must be found after a disDVWHURUFULVLVKDVXQIROGHG´ (1997, 
9).  
Recent literature has identified several important research opportunities in 
this field.  Bakir (2010) calls for an analysis of the responsiveness of private and 
public institutions to different types of risks. As many Western countries rely 
heavily on both private and public sector actors to provide critical services, the 
examination of emergency response must include both. A comparative approach 
across countries also has particular advantages. First, it allows us to increase the 
number of cases for study, as CI failures within one country alone are rare.  
Second, while CI failures seem unique, an examination of media coverage allows 
us to determine if indeed there are patterns of coverage after these events that may 
predict media coverage for future events.  At six cases and three countries, our 
sample size is small.  With this in mind, we propose a modest contribution to 
these important questions.  This article will look at how one newspaper in each 
country examined a domestic natural disaster and industrial failure, and will raise 
some questions for further investigation with respect to cross-national 
comparison.  For the methodological reasons noted below, it will refrain from 
going beyond that.       
  
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The key research questions for this paper are as follows: 
 
x In which ways does print media coverage of natural disasters differ from 
print media coverage of industrial failures? 
 
x Following an event, in which ways does media assessment of government 
performance differ from media performance assessment of key owners and 
operators of CI? 
 
x Finally, what are the potential implications of this media coverage for 
public policy?  
 
3.1. Case Selection 
 
We analyzed one domestic high-profile natural disaster and one domestic 
industrial failure in each of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
(see Table 1), all of which are large, Western countries with similar governance 
structures.3  Their CI is owned and operated by a mix of public and private sector 
actors.   Each government has stated clearly that owners and operators of CI are 
responsible for the critical assets they own.4  
  
                                                          
3All three countries derive their governance arrangements from the Westminster tradition.  Canada 
and Australia are federal systems. The United Kingdom is traditionally described as a unitary 
state, though devolution introduced a degree of decentralization that is similar to a federation.  
4
 For Australia, see Australian Government, Attorney General¶V'HSDUWPHQW (2011); for Canada, 
see Canada, Public Safety Canada (2011); for the U.K., see Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (2011).  
Table 1: Events Selected 
 
                                                          
5
 McLeod (2003)  
6
 McInerney (2005)  
7
 CBC News (2005)   
8
 Johnson, Couture and Nicolet (2007) 
9
 United Kingdom, Cabinet Office (2008) 
10United Kingdom, Heath and Safety Executive (2002)  
Natural Disaster Industrial Failure 
Event Cost Duration 
(Date) 
# of 
deaths 
Event Cost Date # of 
deaths 
Canberra 
bushfires5 
(Australia) 
AUD $300 
million  
(USD 
$305.3 
million ) 
10 days 
(8-18 
January 
2003) 
4 Waterfall 
train 
accident6 
(Australia) 
 
n/a 31 January  
2003 
7 
Hurricane 
Juan7 
(Canada) 
CAD $113 
million  
(USD 
$110.5 
million) 
5 days 
(24-29 
Septemb
er 2003 / 
1 day on 
land) 
8 de la 
Concorde 
overpass8 
collapse 
(Canada) 
 n/a 30 
September  
2006 
5 
 
2007 
flooding 
(U.K.)9 
*%3ǧ
billion  
(USD $4.7 
billion) 
55 days 
(1 June 
1±25 July  
2007) 
13 Potters 
Bar rail 
accident10 
(U.K.) 
  n/a 10 May  
2002 
7 
 
 We selected events that were extreme examples of typical natural disasters 
for each region²flooding in the U.K., hurricanes in Nova Scotia, and bushfires in 
New South Wales.  While there is some variation across the events, these 
examples received more newspaper media coverage than any other domestic 
natural disaster during the year in which they occurred.  These events also caused 
significant loss, measured both in dollars and in human casualties.  (We 
acknowledge, however, that the U.K. flooding deviates from the other examples: 
it lasted longer, cost more, and affected more land mass than the others.  This 
variation constrains the comparison, in volume of coverage in particular.)  
For the industrial failures, three transportation events, each affecting a 
common form of transportation in the three countries, were selected.  In order to 
control further extraneous variables, industrial failures in the same sector were 
chosen.  The costs of these events have not yet been estimated and may never be.   
The three events had a similar number of fatalities.  All events²natural and 
industrial²occurred after 9/11. 
 
3.2. Media Analysis 
 
We selected The Australian (Australia), The Daily Telegraph (U.K.) and The 
Globe and Mail (Canada) because they are the most highly distributed 
broadsheets in the countries in which they publish.11  Using the Factiva database, 
we reviewed 340 newspaper articles in total.12  We identified our sample by 
drawing on all articles that appeared over one year following the date on which 
each event began and which included the term(s) most commonly used to refer to 
the event.  For example, in addition to the ³De la Concorde Overpass Collapse,´ 
ZHXVHGWKHWHUPV³0RQWUHDO%ULGJH&ROODSVH´RU³0RQWUHDO%ULGJH´Articles that 
were clearly not principally about the event were eliminated.  These types of 
events tended to appear in large numbers of articles during the year in which they 
occurred but the references to the events were often asides in articles that were 
principally about something else.  In all cases we chose to examine articles that 
were first and foremost about the event in question.    
For the analysis of the headlines, we drew on the analytical framework of 
Rowe, Frewer, and Sjoberg (2000), which examines not only volume but also 
                                                          
11
 The Daily Telegraph publishes seven days per week; the other two newspapers publish six days 
per week.  For the purposes of this research, this difference only affects volume of coverage and 
performance assessment of government and industry.   
12
 Local media coverage may well yield different results but they are not part of this research 
project. 
media tone and content when considering how risks13 are communicated to the 
public. Headlines were categorized in one of four ways: alarming; reassuring; 
alarming and reassuring; neither alarming nor reassuring.  This article focuses 
only on the more extreme cases²alarming, and reassuring.  It assumes that the 
two middle categories have a neutral effect.  In order to reduce the impact of the 
bias, we assessed all of the articles during a short and fixed period of time 
(between February and March 2010).  We also developed a standard template and 
applied it to all articles. All results were stored in an Access database that we 
developed and maintain, which includes media analysis of 25 CI events.  One 
research assistant classified all articles in The Australian; one classified all articles 
in The Globe and Mail; and one classified all articles in The Daily Telegraph.  
While this approach provides some consistency to the analysis of industrial 
failures and natural disasters within each newspaper, it fails to offer the same 
level of consistency across newspapers. The group did meet initially, however, to 
review articles together in order to introduce some level of consistency.  The 
group also met occasionally throughout the two month assessment period to 
discuss the review process.  Finally, to test the inter-rater reliability of coding for 
all 25 events in the database, ten percent (n = 186) of the 1857 articles in the 
database ZHUHGRXEOHFRGHGLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKHRULJLQDOFRGHUV8VLQJ&RKHQ¶V
kappa coefficient, we found an inter-rater reliability agreement of k = 0.80 for 
tone of the headlines, and k = 0.66 for government performance assessment. This 
corresponds to a substantial level of agreement.  
A few methodological constraints on the headline content analysis bear 
noting. First, what constitutes ³alarming´ is often in the eye of the beholder. In 
general, we judged headlines to be alarming when they used dramatic language 
and implied the potential for a negative outcome or that the event and the 
consequences were ³out of control.´ As best as possible, we tried to wear the hat 
RI WKH QHZVSDSHUV¶ UHODWLYHO\ EURDG WDUJHW DXGLHQFH DQG QRW WKDW RI Dn expert.  
While there were some difficult judgments, most headlines were categorized 
easily. Second, headlines are dramatic.  Though  a headline may be alarming, it 
does not follow that the entire article will be so.  
For analysis of the content of the articles, we determined whether key 
actors, such as government and owners and operators in CI sectors, were assessed 
positively, negatively or neutrally (N/A was also an option).   To summarize the 
performance data, a value of + 1 was assigned to each article that provided, on 
balance, a positive assessment of each key public or private CI entity; a value of -
1 was assigned to each article that was negative  (neutral assessments were given 
a rating of 0).  We then calculated the total net sum, adding the number of positive 
                                                          
13
 Rowe, Frewer, and Sjoberg examine how science and technology risks are communicated to the 
public.   
and negative assessments.  We also present the data as a ratio (negative to positive 
assessments).   
 
4. MEDIA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Volume 
 
The natural disasters examined received considerably more coverage than the 
industrial failures.  As observed in Table 2 below, The Australian featured 46 
articles on the Canberra bushfires while only 26 articles on the Waterfall train 
accident.  The Globe and Mail featured 44 articles on Hurricane Juan and 27 
articles on the de la Concorde overpass collapse.  The Daily Telegraph had a 
significantly higher number of articles by event type than the other two 
newspapers: it featured 151 articles on the U.K. flooding and 44 articles on the 
Potters Bar train accident.   While there is strong evidence of a difference in 
volume of coverage14 the differences in the ratios of front-page to non-front-page 
articles are not significant.  This is true in comparing all six events or if 
aggregated to compare natural disaster with industrial failure.  For instance, 7.2% 
of the industrial failure articles appear on the front page compared with 9.1% of 
the articles about the natural disasters. 
 
 
Table 2: Volume of Coverage of Natural Disasters Versus Industrial Failures 
Event Number of Articles Front Page Coverage 
Natural Disasters 
Canberra bushfires 46 2 
Hurricane Juan 46 5 
U.K. flooding 151 15 
Industrial Failures 
Waterfall train accident 26 0 
de la Concorde overpass 
collapse 
27 3 
Potters Bar rail accident 44 4 
 
In sum, our initial findings do not challenge existing research: the natural 
disasters received more coverage than the industrial failures. However, the ratio of 
front-page to non-front-page articles is similar across all events, which suggests 
                                                          
14Using a one-sided Mann-Whitney Test for comparing these samples resulted in an exact p value 
of 0.05.   
 
that the difference between coverage may be in scaling only, and that volume is 
the key explanatory variable.   
 
4.2. Publication Rate of Articles 
 
We investigated the distribution of articles over time, such that we controlled for 
the volume of coverage and expressed the data in the form of the cumulative 
proportion of articles published.  In addition to calculating the total number of 
articles for each individual event, we compared coverage by newspaper and by 
type of incident.  There were remarkable similarities between the distribution of 
articles across many of these factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Published Articles in Data Set over a One-Year Period 
 
Sixty percent of the articles were published within the first 32 days 
following the event.  Beyond this point the articles were published at a constant 
but much lower rate, as illustrated by the linear relationship in the plot (see Figure 
1).  The median, i.e., the number of days at which point half of the articles were 
published, was 28 days with a 95% confidence interval of (26.6, 29.4).15  We also 
saw more agreement with these events in the first few weeks compared with half 
                                                          
15
 If we were to assume that the publication time of each article was independent and identically 
distributed we would obtain a 95% confidence interval about the median of (26.57, 29.42).  The 
strength of such an assumption would rely in part on the similarities between the distributions for 
each event. 
way through the year, at which point there was some deviation. Figure 2 
illustrates the distribution of articles for each event.    
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of Distribution of Articles by Event Shows More Similarity 
in Early Period than Mid Period 
 
The rate of publication across all events was similar but not entirely 
consistent.  We see from Figure 2 that Potters Bar had the greatest proportion of 
articles published in the days immediately following the event, while the de la 
Concorde overpass collapse had the greatest proportion published after 100 days.  
We used nonparametric tests16 to assess if the observed differences in the data 
were systematic, i.e., if there were a similar systematic pattern to the publications, 
                                                          
16
 We used the Mann-Whitney U Test when comparing two sub-populations and the Kruskal-
Wallis Test when comparing more than two (Conver 1999). 
allowing the observed differences to be explained as random variation.  The 
hypothesis that the six events were sampled from the same distribution was 
rejected at the 5% significance level.  If we remove Potters Bar from the analysis 
the hypothesis is not rejected, which is to say that there is similarity in the 
publication rates across five of the six events.  Grouping the events by newspaper, 
again, we see similar but not identical patterns.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
distributions aggregated by newspaper.  These distributions are not significantly 
different.17 
 
  Figure 3. Distribution of Articles by Country is Not Significantly Different 
 
                                                          
17Using the Kruskal-Wallis Test, the hypothesis that the three distributions in Figure 3 are sampled 
from the same distribution resulted in a significance value of 0.966 and thus would not be rejected 
at the 5% level.   
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Articles by Event Type is Not Significantly Different 
 
There was also little to distinguish between industrial failures and natural 
disasters.  Figure 4 combines the data to illustrate the distributions by type of 
event.  The differences between the distributions were not significant.18  As such 
                                                          
18Using the Mann-Whitney U Test to assess the difference in the distributions between event types 
we obtained a significance value of 0.298 so the null hypothesis that the two distributions have the 
same underlying distribution would not be rejected at the 5% level. 
there is no evidence that the publication rate is systematically different by event 
type.   
 
 
In sum, when we considered the time patterns of coverage and controlled for 
volume, we observed little to distinguish the events either by type or by 
newspaper.  
 
4.3. Tone of Headlines 
 
We calculated the number of articles with an alarming headline as a percentage of 
those that were either alarming or reassuring.  These results are summarized in 
Table 3.  The Globe and Mail had the smallest percentage in both natural disasters 
and industrial failures, with 69.4% and 75.0% respectively, while The Daily 
Telegraph had the highest in both, with 90.3% and 96.6% respectively.    For each 
newspaper the percentage of alarming headlines is approximately 6.0 percentage 
points higher for industrial failures than for natural disasters.     
  
Table 3: Tone of Headlines about Natural Disasters and Industrial Failures  
Event Number of 
Alarming 
Headlines 
Number of 
Reassuring 
Headlines 
Percentage of 
Alarming Headlines 
Natural Disasters 
Canberra bushfires 
(The Australian) 
22 8 73.3% 
Hurricane Juan 
(The Globe and Mail) 
25 11 69.4% 
U.K. flooding 
(The Daily Telegraph) 
93 10 90.3% 
Industrial Failures 
Waterfall train accident 
(The Australian) 
11 3 78.6% 
de la Concorde overpass 
collapse 
(The Globe and Mail) 
15 5 75.0% 
Potters Bar rail accident  
(The Daily Telegraph) 
28 1 96.6% 
 
 
4.4. Performance Assessment: Government  
 
Next we examined how the media articles assessed government performance.   
Each article was assigned to one of four categories: no comment, negative 
assessment, neutral assessment or positive assessment.  For the most part, the 
performance assessments referred to the order of government that was primarily 
responsible for regulating the sector in question.  The provincial government 
regulates bridges in the province of Quebec, for instance, and as result the 
provincial government received the most performance assessments.  That noted, 
we did count all performance assessments of all orders of government, as shown 
in Table 4.     
The industrial failures generally generated more negative performance 
assessments of government than did the natural disasters. There is a wide range of 
performance assessment results for natural disasters.  The Globe and Mail 
published positive assessments of how government performed during Hurricane 
Juan and negative performance assessments of how government performed during 
the de la Concorde overpass collapse.  The Australian had (on balance) marginally 
negative assessments of government during the Canberra bushfires and much 
more negative assessments of government in articles about the Waterfall train 
accident.  The Daily Telegraph gave negative performance assessments of 
government in articles about both the 2007 floods and the Potters Bar train wreck.   
 
Table 4: Performance Assessment Summary for Each Order of Government ± Natural Disasters19 
Event Central/Fed
eral 
Difference 
(Positive ± 
Negative) 
Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Provincial 
Difference 
(Positive ± 
Negative) 
Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Municipal 
Difference 
(Positive ± 
Negative) 
Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Canberra 
bushfires 
(4-9) = -5 2.5:1 (1-0) = 1 0:1 (2-2) = 0 1:1 
Hurricane Juan (5-3) = 2 0.6:1 (11-3) = 8 0.27:1 (9-0) = 6 0:9.0 
U.K. flooding (7-66) = -59 9.4:1 N/A N/A (3-7) = -4 2.3:1 
 
 
Table V: Performance Assessment Summary for Each Order  of Government ± Industrial Failures 
Event Central/Fed
eral 
Difference 
(Positive ± 
Negative) 
Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Provincial 
Difference 
(Positive ± 
Negative) 
Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Municipal 
Net 
Difference 
Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Waterfall train 
accident 
N/A N/A (0-8) = -8 8:0 N/A N/A 
de la Concorde 
overpass collapse 
N/A N/A (1-14) = -13 14:1 N/A N/A 
Potters Bar rail 
accident 
(1-14) = -13 14:1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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 A 0 indicates that there were no counts of performance assessment. 
4.5. Performance Assessment: Key Sectors 
 
When referring to key sectors, this article relies on 3XEOLF6DIHW\&DQDGD¶VOLVWRI
critical sectors.  Different countries have slightly different lists:   Public Safety 
Canada has identified ten sectors; the U.K.¶V&entre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) has identified nine$XVWUDOLD¶V7UXVWHG,QIRUPDWLRQ6KDULQJ
Network (TISN) has identified seven. The FRXQWULHV¶lists are similar, and include 
sectors like finance, water, food, power supply, health, transportation. For the 
purposes of this analysis, ³government´ refers to government departments and 
agencies.  In other words, it would include a department of health but not 
hospitals.  Hospitals would fall under the key sector ³health.´  Similarly, 
³emergency services´ refers to police, fire, military, and ambulance, and is treated 
as a key sector.  The transportation sector refers to private industry, such as road 
or rail construction companies.  Transportation regulators, however, would fall 
under government.      
The articles about natural disasters included performance assessments of 
several key sectors although there were few articles about any one key sector. 
Most of the performance assessments were positive.  Emergency services were 
referred to most often, and the assessments were almost entirely positive.  The 
health sector and the electricity sector received the second highest number of 
assessments, and, again, the assessments were almost always positive.  Some 
sectors received a slightly negative assessment: the finance sector in The Globe 
and Mail¶VFRYHUDJHRIHurricane Juan, and the IT and communications sector in 
The Australian¶Vcoverage of the Canberra bushfires.  There were, however, few 
articles in total.  The only sector that received a somewhat stronger negative 
performance assessment was the water sector in The Daily Telegraph¶Vcoverage 
of the floods. 
Among the industrial failures, fewer sectors were assessed.  Of those 
assessments, few were entirely positive, including assessments of emergency 
services.  Indeed, the transportation sector was assessed negatively in almost all 
cases (see Appendix A for the assessments). 
The publication rate at which key sectors are assessed positively is largely 
the same as the publication rate of negative assessments for industrial failures but 
not for natural disasters.  Figure 5 provides box plots to compare the distribution 
of the articles for each category of assessment of key sectors partitioned also into 
event types. Displayed on the box plot are the minimum, first quartile, median, 
third quartile, and maximum.  Figure 5 also highlights outliers with circles, and 
extreme outliers with stars.  For example, we see that the first article covering an 
industrial event, which negatively assessed industry, appeared on day 0; the last 
one appeared on day 353.  Twenty percent of the articles on industrial failures that 
assessed industry negatively were published by day three; 50% by day 14; and 
75% by day 140.  In contrast, articles about natural disasters, which assessed 
industry negatively, followed a different pattern: the first article was published on 
day 36; the last one was published on day 250.  Twenty-five percent of these 
articles were published by day 40; 50% by day 130; and 75% by day 193.    
There is no evidence of a systematic difference in publication rate of 
negative or positive assessments throughout the year except in the case of natural 
disasters, where a delay in negative assessments of industry was observed.20  
 
 
    
 
                                                          
20Using a Kruskal-Wallis Test, we obtained a significance test statistic of 0.004, thus a statistically 
significant difference at the 1% significance level. 
 Figure 5. Box Plot Illustrating the Distribution of Articles Assessing the 
Performance of Industry for Two Types of Incidents With Only Nature Having 
Statistically Significant Differences 
    
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In many :HVWHUQ JRYHUQPHQWV¶ CI plans, governments stress that the owners and 
operators of CI²largely in the private sector²are responsible for managing their own 
critical assets.21 Yet, despite government policy claims that individual owners and 
                                                          
21For the U.S., see United States, Department of Homeland Security (2008); for the U.K., see 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (2011); for Australia, see Australian 
operators are responsible for their own critical assets, government performance is very 
PXFK³LQWKHIUDPH´GXULQJDQGDIWHUWKHVHHYHQWVDQGDWWHQWLRQFDQQRWEHHDVLO\VKLIWHG
solely to the CI owners and operators.  
This article used a small sample of events and must, therefore, be cautious in any 
generalizations made. Cross-national comparisons, in particular, are limited 
because we only used one newspaper in each country and, despite some effort to 
approach the analysis in a uniform manner, research assistants were each assigned 
a newspaper.  Consequently, comparisons across newspapers are subject to the 
inconsistencies inherent in such a method.  Nevertheless, each newspaper 
followed (at times remarkably) similar patterns: natural disasters received more 
coverage than the industrial failures; the publication rate across all events was 
largely similar; industrial failures received more alarming coverage than natural 
disasters; and performance assessments of government and industry following the 
industrial failures was uniformly negative.  Following natural disasters, 
performance assessment was somewhat mixed, and at times positive.     
Among the cases selected, the 2007 flooding in the United Kingdom 
stands out as a much larger event.  The floods lasted longer and cost considerably 
more.  There was a much higher volume of coverage compared to the other two 
natural disasters and, as a result, a much larger number of performance 
assessments of government.  The floods also occurred at a politically volatile 
time.  Gordon Brown had just become prime minister following Tony %ODLU¶V
UHVLJQDWLRQ%URZQ¶VH[HFXWLYHGLGQRWKDYHDQHZPDQGDWH WRJRYHUQ, which is 
legally acceptable but politically difficult.  As has been noted about Hurricane 
Katrina, major CI events can be amplified even more if there are underlying 
political tensions (Barnes et al. 2008).  Notwithstanding this variation, The Daily 
Telegraph still followed many of the same patterns as the other newspapers with 
respect to natural disasters and industrial failures.     
Future research will attempt to overcome some of the initial 
methodological constraints.  We will, for example, increase the number of cases 
studied. As noted, our database currently has 25 different CI events, which create 
further opportunities for analysis.  We would also like to expand the number of 
newspaper sources.  Newspapers can include ideological biases that lead to 
negative assessments of particular governments.  Increasing the number of 
newspapers and drawing from a wider range across the ideological spectrum will 
help to offset the bias.   One specific challenge rests in identifying similar types of 
events.  These events (thankfully) tend to be rare; finding a perfect match for 
comparison among countries is difficult.  As noted above, the U.K. flooding had a 
much larger scope.  In order to address this issue, we have conducted a similar 
                                                                                                                                                               
Government, Attorney General¶V 'HSDUWPHQW (2011); for Canada, see Canada, Public Safety 
Canada (2011). 
analysis of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (Quigley, Quigley and Pond 2012), which 
ostensibly offers an opportunity to examine an event of a much similar scale that 
occurred at the same time in each of the countries.  The H1N1 pandemic 
generated 1199 articles, which is considerably higher than the number of articles 
analyzed here; the higher number makes generalizations more reliable.          
Further research in this area is warranted because it can provide important 
insights into the contextual pressures that are applied to government policy 
makers following CI failures and, thus, the policy challenges that governments 
face in responding appropriately to such high profile, low probability/high 
consequence risks.  The cases examined here suggest that government 
performance will be scrutinized differently following industrial failures and 
natural disasters.  This finding may seem unsurprising but it contradicts 
government claims that the owners and operators are responsible for CI no matter 
what the event.  Governments are often reluctant to dictate specifically how 
industry should protect its infrastructure, not only because government does not 
want to interfere with market processes, but also because government may not 
wish to take on problems that are better placed with the owners and operators of 
the infrastructure.  As we saw in the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf, 
however, even events that start off (ostensibly) as SULYDWHLQGXVWU\¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\
will eventually draw in the government.  It is only a matter of time before 
commentators start asking about the role of the regulators, and whether or not 
they were corrupt, incompetent or just unlucky prior to the disaster.  Moreover, 
the industrial failures examined here generated a demand for accountability from 
government that the natural disasters did not. The search for accountability seems 
more focused with industrial failures.  This observation reinforces the adage that, 
if you build it, you maintain it.  In this sense, industrial failures could potentially 
generate more political anxiety and, in so doing, disproportionate responses from 
politicians who are sensitive to political backlash.  In Canada, for example, the de 
la Concorde overpass collapse prompted a public inquiry and an extensive review 
of bridges in the province, whereas Hurricane Juan failed to warrant a public 
inquiry despite the considerable social and economic cost of the disaster. 
This inconsistency is ironic.  The natural disasters studied cost more and 
affected more people than did the industrial failures.  The comparatively positive 
(or less negative) coverage that government agencies received during natural 
disasters potentially limited institutional learning.  As Steinberg (2000) notes, 
there are several political and budgetary decisions that are taken well in advance 
of any natural disaster, which have significant impact on our collective ability to 
respond effectively to disasters, including where and to what standard we should 
build.  If media coverage of these natural disasters continues to be snap-shot and 
episodic, focusing largely on survival in the face of ³Acts of God,´ and positive 
assessments of emergency services with few (and delayed) negative assessments 
of key sectors, it potentially undermines our capacity to reflect more seriously on 
the funding and political decisions that were taken prior to these events yet have 
potentially serious implications for their outcomes.   
Equally disconcerting is the fact that the events selected for this study are 
typical of the regions in which they took place.  In other words, these events will 
likely happen again.  Effective emergency response demands well-informed 
government, CI service providers, and public.  It behooves the government to do 
its utmost to reflect more critically on its performance and allow citizens to reflect 
on the governmenW¶VSHUIRUPDQFHas well as the performance of the community as 
a whole.  In so doing, governments together with citizens and key sectors can help 
to ensure that future economic and social losses are minimized.   
 
 
        
 
 
  
Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Performance Assessment of Key Sectors ± Canberra Bushfires 
 
 
Sector Number of 
Positive 
Assessments 
Number of 
Negative 
Assessments 
Net Difference Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
NFP Community 
(Emergency 
Response)* 
4 0 4 0:4 
Health Care 2 0 2 0:2 
Electrical  2 0 2 0:2 
Fire 1 0 1 0:1 
Communications 
and IT 
1 2  2:1 
Police 1 0 1 0:1 
*NFP: Not-for-Profit.  This includes organizations such as the Red Cross. 
 
Table A2: Performance Assessment by Key Sectors ± Hurricane Juan 
 
Sector Number of 
Positive 
Assessments 
Number of 
Negative 
Assessments 
Net Difference Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
NFP Community 
(Emergency 
3 0 3 0:3 
Response) 
Health Care 3 0 3 0:3 
Electrical  3 1 2 1:3 
Police 4 0 4 0:4 
Fire 5 0 5 0:5 
Ambulance 3 0 3 0:3 
Military 6 2 6 1:3 
Finance 1 2  2:1 
Water 1 1   
 
Table A3: Performance Assessment by Key Sectors ± U.K. Flooding 
 
Sector Number of 
Positive 
Assessments 
Number of 
Negative 
Assessments 
Net Difference Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
NFP Community 
(Emergency 
Response) 
9 0 9 0:9 
Water 1 8 -7 8:1 
Police 10 0 10 0:10 
Fire 17 0 17 0:17 
Ambulance 2 0 2 0:2 
Military 6 0 6 0:6 
Communications 
and IT 
 20 2 0:2 
 
 
Table A4: Performance Assessment by Key Sectors ± Waterfall Train Accident 
 
Sector Number of 
Positive 
Assessments 
Number of 
Negative 
Assessments 
Net Difference Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Transportation 0 8 -8 8:0 
Communications 
and IT 
0 1  1:0 
Ambulance 1 1   
Judiciary 1 1   
 
Table A5: Performance Assessment by Key Sectors ± De la Concorde Overpass Collapse 
 
Sector Number of 
Positive 
Assessments 
Number of 
Negative 
Assessments 
Net Difference Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Transportation 2 8 -6 4:1 
Police 1   0:1 
Manufacturing 1 1  1:1 
 
Table A6: Performance Assessment by Key Sectors ± Potters Bar Rail Accident 
 
Sector Number of 
Positive 
Assessments 
Number of 
Negative 
Assessments 
Net Difference Ratio of 
Negative to 
Positive 
Assessments 
Transportation 0 35 -35 35:0 
Finance  2  2:0 
Fire 1   0:1 
Ambulance 1   0:1 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alaszewski, A. 2005.  ³Risk communication: identifying the importance of social 
context.´ Health Risk and Society 7(2): 101±106. 
 
Atwood, L.E., and A.M. Major. 2000. ³Optimism, pessimism, and communication 
behavior in response to an earthquake prediction.´ Public Understanding 
of Science  9(2): 417±431. 
 
$XVWUDOLDQ*RYHUQPHQW$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO¶V'HSDUWPHQWTrusted 
Information Sharing Network. TISN for Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
[Internet]. Accessed on 11 October 2011.  Available at  
http://www.tisn.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx  
Bakir, V.  2010. ³Media and risk: old and new research directions.´ Journal of 
Risk Research 13(1): 221±228.  
 
Barnes, M.D., C.L. Hanson, L.M.B. Novilla, A.T. Meacham, E. McIntyre, and 
B.C. Erikson. 2008. ³Analysis of media agenda setting during and after 
Hurricane Katrina: implications for emergency preparedness, disasters 
response, and disaster policy.´ American Journal of Public Health 98(4): 
604±610. 
 
Baron, J., J.C. Hershey, and H. Kunreuther. 2000. ³Determinants of priority for 
risk reduction: the role of worry.´ Risk Analysis 20(4): 413±428. 
 
Boholm, M. 2009. ³Risk and causality in newspaper reporting.´ Risk Analysis 
29(11): 1566±1577.  
 
Brun, W.  1994.³Risk perception: main issues, approaches, and findings.´ In 
Subjective Probability, edited by G. Wright and P. Ayton, 295±320. 
Chichester, U.K.: Wiley. 
  
Canada. Public Safety Canada. 2011. Canadian Disaster Database [updated 14 
January 2011]. Accessed on 12 October 2011.  Available from 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/cdd/srch-eng.aspx  
  
CBC News. 2005.  Forces of Nature [Internet]. Cited December 2011. Available 
from http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/forcesofnature/index.html 
 
Conver, W.J. 1999. Practical Nonparametric Statistics. 3rd ed. New York: Wiley.  
 
Cottle, S. 2000. ³1HZVWLPHVWRZDUGVDµsecond wave¶ of news ethnography.´ 
Communications 25(1): 19±42.  
 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. 2011. Accessed on 12 
October 2011.  Available from http://www.cpni.gov.uk  
 
Drottz-Sjoberg, B.M. 1991. ³Non-experts definitions of risk and risk perception.´ 
In RHIZIKON: Risk Research Reports, no. 3. Stockholm: Center for Risk 
Research. 
 
Fischhoff, B. 1985. ³Managing risk perception.´ Issues in Science and 
Technology 2: 3±96. 
 
------. 1995. ³Risk perception and communication unplugged: twenty years of 
process.´ Risk Analysis 15(2): 137±145. 
 
Frewer, L. 2004. ³The public and effective risk communication.´ Toxicology 
Letters 149(1): 391.  
 
Gaskell G., M. Bauer, J. Durant, and N. Allum. 1999. ³Worlds apart? The 
reception of genetically modified foods in Europe and the US.´ Science  
285(16): 384±387. 
 
Hood, C., H. Rothstein, and R. Baldwin. 2001. The Government of Risk: 
Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Hughes, A., and L. Pelan. 2010. ³Twitter adoption and use in mass convergence  
and emergency events.´ International Journal of Emergency Management 
6 (3/4): 248±260.  
 
Johnson, B.B., and V.Y. Cavello. 1987. The Social and Cultural Construction of 
Risk. Dordrecht: Reidel, 12.  
 
Johnson, P., A. Couture, and R.  Nicolet. 2007. Report of the Commission of 
inquiry into the collapse of a portion of the de la Concorde overpass 
[Internet]. Quebec: Gouvernement du Québec. Accessed December 2011. 
Available from 
http://www.cevc.gouv.qc.ca/UserFiles/File/Rapport/report_eng.pdf 
 
 
Kasperson, R., O. Renn, P. Slovic, H. Brown, J. Emel, R. Globe, J. Kasperson, 
and S. Ratick. 1998. ³The social amplification of risk: a conceptual 
framework.´ Risk Analysis 8(2): 177±187. 
 
Kitzinger, J., and J. Reilly. 1997.  ³The rise and fall of risk reporting: media 
coverage of human genetics research, false memory syndrome and mad 
cow disease.´ European Journal of Communication 12(3): 319±350.  
 
Kraus, N.N., T. Malmfors, and P. Slovic. 2001. ³Intuitive toxicology: Experts and 
lay judgements of  chemical risks.´ In Perception of Risk, edited by P. 
Slovic, 285±315. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Leahy, P.J., and A. Mazur. 1980. ³The rise and fall of public opposition in 
specific social movements.´ Social Studies of Science 10(3): 259±84. 
 
McInerney, Peter. 2005. Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Rail 
Accident [Internet]. New South Wales. Cited December 2011. Available 
from 
http://www.railcorp.info/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/7145/Waterfall_Inqui
ry-Final_Report.pdf  
 
McLeod, R. 2003. Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 
Bushfires in the ACT [Internet]. Canberra: Cabinet Office. Cited December 
2011. Available from  
http://www.cmd.act.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0008/113939/McLeodInqu
iry.pdf 
 
Moeller, S.D. 2006. ³Regarding the pain of others: media, bias and the coverage 
of international disasters.´ Journal of International Affairs 59(2): 173±
196. 
 
Mutz, D.C., and J. Soss.  1997. ³Reading public opinion: the influence of news 
coverage on perceptions of public sentiment.´  Public Opinion Quarterly 
61(3): 431±451. 
 
Pidgeon, N. 1997. ³The limits to safety? Culture, politics, learning and man-made 
disasters.´ Jounal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 5(1): 1±14.  
Quigley, K. 2005. ³Bug reactions: considering US government and UK 
government Y2K operations in light of media coverage and public opinion 
polls.´ Health, Risk & Society 7(3): 267±291.  
------.  2008. ³Opinion-responsive hypothesis´,Q Responding to Crises in the 
Modern Infrastructure: Policy Lessons from Y2K, 95-121. Houndsmill, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Quigley, K., J. Quigley, and E. Pond. 2012. ³Convergence, variation and volatility 
in H1N1 coverage in four national newspapers.´  CIP Initiative Working 
Paper.  Published at www.cip.management.dal.ca.   
Rowe, G., L. Frewer, and L. Sjoberg. 2000. ³Newspaper reporting of hazards in 
the UK and Sweden.´ Public Understanding of Science 9(1): 59±78. 
 
Rundmo, T. ³Perceived risk, health and consumer behaviour.´ Journal of 
Risk Research 2(3): 187±200.  
 
Rundmo, T., and B.E. Moen. 2006. ³Risk perception and demand for risk 
mitigation in transport: a comparison of lay people, politicians and 
experts.´ Journal of Risk Research 6: 623±640. 
 
Slovic, P. ³Perception of risk.´ Science 236: 280±285. 
 
Slovic, P., M.L. Finucane, E. Peters, and D.G. MacGregor. 2004. ³Risk as 
analysis and risk as feelings: some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and 
rationality.´ Risk Analysis 24(2): 311±322. 
 
Soumerai, S.B., D. Ross-Degnan, and J.S. Kahn. 1992. ³Effects of professional 
and media warnings about the association between aspirin use in children 
DQG5H\H¶VV\QGURPH´ Millbank Quarterly 70(1): 155±182. 
 
Steinberg, T. 2000. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in 
America. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
United Kingdom. Cabinet Office. 2008. Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods ± 
Full Report [Internet]. Accessed in December 2011. Available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.
cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/_/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/
flooding_review/pitt_review_full%20pdf.pdf 
------. Health and Safety Executive. 2002. Train Derailment at Potters Bar ± 
Friday 10 May 2002: HSE Interim Report [Internet]. Cited December 
2011. Available from http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/incident-
pottersbar-interim.pdf 
 United States. Department of Homeland Security. 2008. One Team, One Mission, 
Securing Our Homeland: US Department of Homeland Security Strategic 
Plan, Fiscal Years 2009-2013. Accessed on 11 October 2011.  Available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf  
Wahlberg, A., and L. Sjoberg. 2000. ³Risk perception and the media.´ Journal of 
Risk Research 3(1): 31±50. 
